thesis

Asymetrie d'information et rationnement partiel du credit

Defense date:

Jan. 1, 1997

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Institution:

Lille 2

Disciplines:

Management sciences

Authors:

Directors:

Abstract EN:

This research aims at legitimising the partial rationing of bank credit established where the demand of the debtor is partly met. Being in a situation of assymetrical situation "ex-ante", the partial rationing of credit is shown to be the bank's most efficient answer to the problem of selection adverse. More precisely, the partial rationing of credit happens to be a characteristic of the loan contract, which, associated with the interest rate, enables banks to single out the credit-worthiness of every customer. The result, morever, is all the more reliable as it prevents the introduction into the model of more sophisticated bank contracts such as credit commitments.

Abstract FR:

Cette recherche vise a legitimer le rationnement partiel du credit bancaire defini comme une situation dans laquelle la demande du debiteur est partiellement satisfaite. Nous situant dans un cadre d'asymetrie d'information "ex-ante", nous montrons que le rationnement partiel du credit est la reponse efficiente d'une banque au probleme de l'antiselection. Plus precisement, le rationnement partiel du credit s'avere etre une caracteristique du contrat de credit qui, associee au taux d'interet, permet aux banques d'identifier la qualite de chaque client. Ce resultat, de plus, se revele robuste : il resiste a l'introduction dans le modele de contrats bancaires plus sophistiques tels que le credit confirme.