La conception de la coutume internationale dans la jurisprudence de la c. I. J. (etude et analyse)
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Abstract EN:
The lesson drawn from the i. C. J. Jurisprudence about international custom is that the latter is not a pre-existing legal norm having a predetermined objective value like the conventional norm. It is in a way latent norm that lends itself to legal investigation only when there is a dispute between subjects of international law. Being the outcome of the whole set of acts and behaviours of these subjects in the international sphere, it is found entrenched in a process form which the judge ought to isolate it and give it the form and content of a legal norm form which it is possible to deduce a particular solution. These acts and behaviours should therefore satisfy certain conditions (repetition,generality,duration,imputability to a subject of international law) which enable the judge to qualify them legally. If it is proved that their authors (states or international organisations)intended to act on legal grounds (opinio juris sive necessitatis), the judge declares that these acts and behaviours constitute an applicable customary norm. But, first, he has to resolve the problem of its opposability by saying why it is binding on the defending party. Is it by virtue of its consent or by virtue of other objective characters beyond its control? if he returns a verdict of subjective opposability, he takes into account the situation and the behaviours of this party during the customary process. If he returns a verdict of objective opposability, he proclaims the opposable customary norm, no matter the behaviours and situation of the party in relation to this process. Once the problem of opposability of the custom is resolved, the international judge engages his attention in the problem of conflict between general custom and particular custom, and between custom and treaty in order to determine the rule applicable to the litigation laid before him. As for the basis of the custom, jurisprudence shows that the international judge ought to be satisfied with attributing legal effects to all practices which fulfil the conditions that lead him to recognise law in them. He therefore does not have to pronounce his opinion on its basis, as the volontarist and objectivist doctrine seems to suggest to him.
Abstract FR:
L'enseignement tire de la jurisprudence de la cour internationale de justice au sujet de la coutume internationale est que celle-ci n'est pas une norme juridique preexistante ayant une valeur objective affirmee a priori comme la norme conventionnelle. Elle est en quelque sorte latente et ne s'offre a l'examen juridique qu'a l'occassion d'un differend entre sujets du droit international. Issue de l'ensemble des actes et comportements de ces sujets dans la sphere internationale, elle se trouve cantonnee dans un processus duquel le juge doit la degager et lui donner la forme et le contenu d'une norme juridique dont il est possible de deduire une solution particuliere. Ces actes et ces comportements doivent donc remplir certaines conditions (repetition, generalite, duree, imputabilite a un sujet de droit international) qui permettent au juge de les qualifier juridiquement. Si la preuve que leurs auteurs (etats ou organisations internationales) ont entendu se placer sur le terrain juridique en les accomplissant(opinio juris sive necessitatis) est etablie, le juge declare que ces actes et comportements constituent une norme coutumiere internationale susceptible d'etre appliquee. Mais il a a resoudre auparavant le probleme de son opposabilite en disant pourquoi elle s'impose a la partie defenderesse. Est-ce en vertu de son consentement ou en vertu d'autres caracteres objectifs independants de toute volonte? s'il conclut a une opposabilite subjective, il tient compte de la situation et des comportements de cette partie lors du processus coutumier. S'il conclut a une opposabilite objective, il luideclare la norme coutumiere opposable quels que soient ses comportements et sa situation par rapport au processus. Une fois le probleme de l'opposabilite resolu, le juge international se penche sur celui du conflit entre coutmes generales et coutumes particulieres et entre coutumes et traites en vue de determiner la regle applicable au litige qui lui a ete soumis. Quant au fondement de la coutume, la jurisprudence montre que le juge doit se contenter d'attribuer des effets juridiques a toute pratique qui remplit les conditions qui le portent a y voir le droit. Il n'a donc pas a se prononcer sur son fondement, comme semble le lui suggerer la doctrine volontariste et objectiviste