Abstract EN:

The Lebanese system of government did implicitly adopt the principle of arbitration. However, nothing was done in order to dissipate the ambiguity which heavily burdens the concept of arbitration, because it oscillates between a wide and a narrow acceptance. Moreover, the Lebanese system tries hard to conciliate the characteristics of the parliamentary system with the principle of sectarian and communitarian participation in the government, i. E. A consensual system of government. But the incompatibility between these two principles has greatly affected the arbitration nature of the presidential function. Therefore, the domination of the sectarian and communitarian logic over the parliamentary logic in the Lebanese system perturbs not only the arbitration principle itself, but equally its putting into effect and practice. This dominance influences de facto the instruments which are supposed to insure an effective arbitration. In fact, a deep analysis of the presidential powers demonstrates that the means put at the disposal of the president in order to insure and guarantee the said arbitration function seem to be rarely satisfactory