La personnalite morale demythifiee : contribution a la definition de la nature juridique des societes de personnes quebecoises
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Paris 1Disciplines:
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Abstract EN:
In the french and the quebec systems of law, legal personality is characterized by a cleavage in the concept. On the one hand, it appears to be more of a condition to ensure the efficiency of group actions, while on the other - traditionally the representation of interests of more than one person - it has become recognized as mere techniques for group representation or of assignments of assets. This common observation made of the insufficiencies of the concept underlying legal personality constituted the culminating point in the orientation of this thesis. It has led to first questioning the very basis of legal personality and second, the classical theory of patrimonial unity, without which legal personality would not have undergone such development. Thus, a fresh analysis of the concept is now in order. Legal personality is neither a fiction nor a reality, but simply the juridical technique used by the legislator to designate entities other than natural persons that may be recognized as subjects of rights once this definition received acceptance, it became necessary to turn to other concepts in order to explain the nature of quebec partnerships. The introduction into the new civilcode of the theory of patrimony by appropriation provided an interesting alternative. If the basis of an autonomous patrimony of associations could no longer reside in legal personality, then the concept of patrimony by appropriation could explain it adequately. This approach provided, in fact, several advantages : it made it possible to resolve the paradox underlying partnerships while maintaining the unity of the legal person. Furthermore, it brought about a reconciliation of positive law with historical precedent by confirming the historie abnormality in determining the juridical nature of partnerships.
Abstract FR:
La personnalite morale est frappee, en droits francais et quebecois, par un morcellement du concept. D'un cote, elle n'apparait plus une condition a l'efficacite de l'action collective; de l'autre, elle,-qui se voulait traditionnellement la representation des interets d'une pluralite de personnes-, se voit aujourd'hui reconnue a de simples techniques de representation collective ou encore a des affectations de biens. Ce constat commun effectue sur les insuffisances du concept de personnalite morale a constitue le point culminant dans l'orientation de cette these. Il aura conduit a remettre en question, d'une part, les fondements memes de la personnalite morale et, d'autre part, la theorie classique de l'unite patrimoniale, sans qui la personnalite morale n'aurait pas connu un tel essor. Une nouvelle analyse du concept a donc ete necessaire. La personnalite morale n'est ainsi ni une fiction, ni une realite, mais simplement la technique juridique employee par le legislateur pour designer la qualite de sujet de droit des entites autres que les personnes physiques. Cette definition acceptee, il devenait imperieux de se tourner vers d'autres notions pour expliquer la nature des societes quebecoises. L'ouverture du nouveau code a la theorie du patrimoine d'affectation offrait une alternative interessante. Si le fondement du patrimoine autonome des societes ne pouvait plus resider dans la personnalite morale, l'affectation patrimoniale pouvait tres bien l'expliquer. Cette conception avait, en fait, plusieurs avantages: elle permettait de resoudre le paradoxe de la societe de personnes, tout en maintenant l'unite de la personnalite morale; elle engendrait, de plus, une reconciliation du droit positif avec l'histoire en confirmant l'anomalie historique dans la determination de la nature juridique de la societe.