Abstract EN:

Since the late 1980s, Muslim movements have become visible in public universities and in the Senegalese political scene. Murid or Tidjian “dahiras” (communities) and other reformist associations organize various on-campus activities, such as weekly religious meetings, Islamic conferences, Quran lessons, and prayers. In addition to the emergence of these movements at public universities, the number of private Islamic schools has also increased since the 1990s, encouraged by the former government of Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012) and supported by partners from Arab countries. This study examined these religious dynamics at institutions of higher education. Why and how do Muslim scholars represent a growing dynamic in institutions of higher education in contemporary Senegal, and how do they contribute to the production of new knowledge and power (savoirs-pouvoirs)? The answer to this question is given in two sections: a historical construction of Senegalese Muslim scholars and their relation to politics and education; and a new generation of Muslim actors, their religious life and spheres of expression, knowledge, and power.The first part of this study focuses on the historical construction of Muslim scholars since the colonial time and their relations to politics and education. A study of the change in higher education and State politics over the past half century showed the deep transformation of Senegalese society and the recent evolution of a new type of Muslim scholar. Since the colonial time, Muslim intellectuals and “arabisants” (the Arabic-speaking elite) have played an essential role in politics in Senegal. Often intermediaries between the French colony and the Senegalese indigenous population, this elite created its own status, roles, and identity. However, with the creation of modern French institutions of higher education, a new French-speaking elite or “ku jang ekool” has emerged.Between 1960 and 1980, the University of Dakar became a place of political struggle, and students developed Marxist ideologies, although there were very few religious associations and few of the Arabic/French-speaking elite were involved in the Islamic associations. The new generation of young Muslim scholars who emerged after 1980 consisted of a completely different population, as compared with the previous generation; its members were originally from the non-elite class and attracted to the traditional religious solidarity of Sufi brotherhoods. Young, liberal, and autonomous, the new religious actors are challenging the social and cultural norms of the previous generation. This transformation explains the change in the larger Senegalese political and educational scene. In fact, new politico-religious movements developed during the ideological and sociopolitical crisis of the 1980s and 90s, and the arrival of political liberalism in 2000. During this time, the universities have become more popular and associated with the lower social classes, rooted in traditional Islamic educational spaces (Quranic schools and Sufi brotherhoods) and involved in the new political scene. However, the two generations of political/religious activists share a common characteristic: both create what we call “societal energy”, promoting a new model of society for young people who are keen to participate in social and political reform.The second part of this study, based on field observations made between 2003 and 2015, describes today’s Muslim scholars and their political and religious involvement. Our observations found great diversity in the experience of “being Muslim” among young people who navigate through different values, such as Islamic teaching, Sufi spiritualism, Western modernity, and traditional Senegalese culture. They create “shifting” corporal and spatial practices inside and outside the universities. In fact, their flexibility and liberty vis-à-vis religion and politics have created new social and political dynamics in Senegal.