Abstract EN:

This dissertation presents : when an organization tries to ameliorate its performance by strategically changing its underlying policies and norms, as the coordination between its members tends to be transformed into a prisoner's dilemma situation, in fact, the results of the strategic change cannot reach a desired level. Hence, theoretically, (1) (in terms of organizational learning) any voluntary organizational action whose objective represents a double loop learning (which is a more profound learning than a single loop learning) has its own limits in itself; (2) (from the perspective of micro-micro economics) we argue that organizational efficiency is de facto sub-optimal because dynamically counterproductive coordination repeats in the organization (cf. Leibenstein's x-inefficiency). (3) we suggest a concept of internal organizing efficiency' to represent an important aspect of organizational efficiency. In chapter 1, principal concepts on organizational learning and a game-theoretic model (coordination game) are presented. In chapter 2, empirical studies based on qualitative data (interviews, surveys) are utilized to show the dynamics of the case, which is a korean firm in electronics. In chapter 3, a litterature survey is presented.