Recherche-développement : une analyse en terme de stratégies concurrentielles
Institution:
Paris 2Disciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
This thesis has been inspired by neo-schumpeterian analysis, that examines research-development by means of concurrential strategies. The objective of this report is to develop the two following subjects : on one hand, the strategic behaviour of firms that deal with oligopolistic competition and on the other hand, their motivations to carry out activities of r&d by considering the strategic dimension of incitements and the nature of their mutual influences towards industrial structures. At first, according to the general idea of theoretical analysis of oligopolies, the different equilibrium concepts of gale theory applied to oligopoly dynalics will be illustrated economically. Secondly, a reasoned synthese of the new theory of r&d will be presented in two different contexte : the decisional theory and the game theory. In order to conceive a patent race model with learning effects, spillower presence and the possibility of temporary cooperation between firms during competition, the elaboration of games concerning the patent system and the learning process during the expansion of r&d has been throughly clarified in this thesis.
Abstract FR:
Cette these, inspiree des analyses neo-schumpeteriennes qui examinent l'activite de recherche-developpement en termes de strategies concurrentielles, s'articule autour de deux themes principaux : d'une part, les comportements strategiques des entreprises en coucurrence oligopolistique, d'autre part, leurs motivations a entreprendre une activite de r&d, en considerant les dimensions strategiques de telles incitations et la nature de leurs influence reciproques avec les structures industrielles. En premier lieu, apres un apercy des fondements theoriques de l'analyse des oligopoles, nous presentons les differents concepts d' equilibre de theorie des jeux appliques a la dynamique des oligopoles dans un cadre d'illustration economique. En second lieu, noius proposons une synthese raisonnee des differentes analyses de la nouvelle theorie de la r&d, dans un contexte de theorie de la decision puis de theorie des jeux. Nous construisons ensemble un modele de course au brevet avec effets d'apprentissage, presence d'externalites et possibilite pour les entreprises de cooperer, de facon temporaire, a certains moment de la competition pour l'nnovation.