Réflexions sur trois dimensions du problème de risque moral
Institution:
Paris, EHESSDisciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
This study considers three aspects of moral hazard in which the agent's behavior can not be observed by the principal. The first part deals with the trade-off problem between control frequency and paiement schemes as well as with the necessary conditions to be satisfied in order to implement the first-best solution. An agent and a principal are often engaged on a long-term basis contract. A second extension of our basic model is then to introduce a temporal dimension and examine its consequences on the resulting optimal contract solution. The last part deals with cases in which a principal is licked simultaneously to several agents. The optimal contract and the emerging game structure between the principal and the agents relies crucially on the kind of the effective interconnexions between the agents as well as on the production technology.
Abstract FR:
Cette these analyse trois aspects du probleme de risque moral, dans lequel le comportement de l'agent n'est pas observable par le principal. La premiere partie traite de l'arbitrage entre la frequence du controle et la forme des mecanismes de paiement et des conditions dans lesquelles la solution de premier rang est concretisable. La relation entre principal et agent est souvent durable. La deuxieme extension du modele de base introduit une dimension temporelle et en analyse les consequences sur le contrat optimal. Enfin, la troisieme partie etudie des situations dans lesquelles le principal est lie simultanement a plusieurs agents. Le contrat optimal et la structure meme du jeu entre principal et agents reposent fortement sur la relation entre les agents et sur la technique de production.