Analyse économique du droit de la faillite
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Paris 2Disciplines:
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Abstract EN:
This work is devoted to an economic analysis of the law of bankruptcy. It aims to answer the following question : do the rules on bankruptcy allow an efficient reduction of conflicts between creditors and debtors ? the first part of this work is devoted to the historical reasons of the decline in the law of contract and sets out the arguments for and against this decline. The second part presents the nature of the enterprise and the role of the law of bankruptcy. This part also describes those factors that increase gains and costs and the role of the law of bankruptcy in the internalizing of these costs. The third part presents a model of a single creditor and debtor in order to show the impact of the rules of the law of bankruptcy (prohibition of bankruptcy, discharge) on conflict resolution and increased efficiency. Apparently, none of these rules of law solves the problem of bankruptcy efficiently or justly. To demonstrate this point, we have based ourselves on the contractual freedom between the creditor and debtor parties, as advanced by the coase theorem. The fourth part is devoted to the development of several creditors model. It addresses the problem of a tug-of-war between the different creditors. Centered on the cost of conflict, it examines the efficiency of the law governing compulsory collective procedure with a view to achieving maximum efficiency. The role of warranties and of insurance of this cost reduction is also addressed.
Abstract FR:
Ce travail est consacre a l'analyse economique du droit de la faillite. Il repond a la question suivante : les regles du droit de la faillite sont-elles efficientes dans le sens ou elles permettent de reduire le conflit entre creanciers et debiteurs ? la premiere partie de ce travail est consacree aux raisons historiques du declin du droit contractuel et expose les differents arguments favorables ou non a ce declin. La deuxieme partie presente la nature de l'entreprise et le role du droit de la faillite. Elle expose egalement les facteurs qui augmentent les gains et les couts et le role du droit de la faillite dans l'internalisation de ces couts. La troisieme partie presente un modele comprenant un creancier et un debiteur. Le but est de montrer l'impact des differentes regles du droit de faillite (interdiction de la faillite, decharge. . . ) sur la resolution des conflits et la reduction des couts. Il apparait qu'aucune de ces regles de droit n'est efficiente ou juste pour resoudre le probleme de la faillite. La demarche adoptee est celle de la liberte contractuelle entre les parties creanciere et debitrice a l'image du theoreme de coase. La quatrieme partie est consacree au developpement du modele a plusieurs creanciers. Axee sur le cout du conflit, elle examine l'efficience de la regle de la procedure collective obligatoire dans la maximisation de la richesse. Elle expose egalement le role des suretes et de l'assurance dans la reduction de ce cout.