Contribution a l'analyse des procedures de decision collective
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Abstract EN:
We analyze and compare in this thesis some well-known collective decision procedures (including the plurality rule and the runoff voting system). Two types of criteria are used for evaluating these procedures. The first ones are based on the majority principle, whereas the second are manipulability criteria. The results we obtain show that the performances of the procedures under consideration are quite different. The widely used plurality rule appears to be inferior to most of the other systems.
Abstract FR:
Diverses procedures de decision collective (p. D. C. ), d'usage courant pour la plupart, sont analysees et comparees a l'aide de deux types de criteres. Les premiers rendent compte de la capacite des procedures en question a choisir une option qui ne peut etre remise en cause par une majorite d'agents; les seconds traduisent leur aptitude a resister aux tentatives de manipulation, individuelles ou collectives. Les resultats obtenus montrent que les performances des p. D. C. Etudiees sont loin d'etre equivalentes. La p. D. C. La plus couramment utilisee -le vote a la majorite simple- apparait comme l'une des moins satisfaisantes.