Abstract EN:

This thesis strives for defining the behaviour of prudence for a polluter that results from the setting of the precautionary principle with the polluter-payer principle. The theoretical point of view defended focuses on the negotiation between the polluter and the involved society before the bigining of the concerned hazardous activity, ratehr than on the regulatory relation between the regulator and the polluter while dealing with the activity. The analysis of prudence is carried through in two main stages. In the first step, the negotiation's content is defined. The "principle of the victim of pollution prime contractor of the cleaning up" is pointed out and its limits (grounded on asymetrical information) are explored. In the second step, the choice of the negotiation process to use to implement the "principle of the victim of pollution prime contractor of the cleaning up" is examined. The reasopn of desagreement that may arise, which do not come from the activity's dangerousness but from a problem of proceeding (equilibrium selection), are explained. Finally, the consequence on the prudent behaviour of the polluter of the presence of an other polluter of the same kind is investigated.