L'économie de la corruption
Institution:
Paris 13Disciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
Corruption is a particular case of agency models. To the majority of economists, and according to works on the economics of crime and rent-seeking society, we have a market for corruption where supply and demand are subjected to constraints of sanction. These authors treat only occasional and unorganised exchanges between impersonal agents (market corruption), whereas the phenomenon begins to pose an economic and a political problem when it becomes institutionalized, when it is personalized (pariochal corruption or social exchange corruption) and when it organizes itself through the legal social network of clientelism, thus allowing for non-specific and compensable exchanges over time in an undetermined manner. Our thesis, after a presentation of great controversies and a critical approach of existing economic literature, offers a theory of corruption networks that spread from the modalities of hybrid coordination.
Abstract FR:
La corruption est un cas particulier de modeles d'agence. Pour la majorite des economistes, a partir des travaux de l'economie du crime, et sur la "rent-seeking society" nous avons un marche de la corruption ou l'offre et la demande sont soumis a une contrainte de sanction. Ces auteurs ne traitent que d'echanges ponctuels et inorganises d'agents impersonnels (corruption troc), alors que le phenomene commence a poser un probleme economique et politique quand il s'institutionnalise, se personalise (corruption relationnelle ou echange-social) et s'organise a partir des reseaux sociaux legaux du clientelisme, permettant des echanges non specifies et compensables dans le temps de facon indetermine. Notre these - a la suite d'une presentation des grandes controverses et d'une presentation critique de la litterature economique existante - offre une theorie des reseaux de corruption qui se developpent a partir de modalites de coordination hybrides.