Husserl : chose et espace
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Abstract EN:
First part : french translation of husserl's dingvorlesung (1907 summer term course) and of complementary texts, as published in the original ed. By u. Claesges (hua, 16) husserl defines there the fundamental notions of his phenomenology of perception. Then, after a fundamental analysis of the simpler case of perceptions wherein sense data remain unchanged, he develops the intentional implications of cinetically synthetized perceptions; it leads to pointing out the essential inadequateness of every perception of a thing. The last two divisions of the work are dedicated to the study of the kinesthesis-sense field coordination, and to its definite type. Second part : 1) translator's brief comments and critical remarks, related to the first part text. 2) a synthetic essay on husserl's theory of the constitution of material things in perception : the a. Sets forth the decisive import of passive synthesis and its phenomenology. He traces the double fundamental question of the meaning of "being" and "being-so" in the case of material reality. He criticizes the wrong understanding of "phenomenological attitude" as a "reductive" operation --a typically cartesian gesture. Hence the methodological and logical requirements of the concept of constitution. Analyzing the presuppositions of the latter, the a. Shows that founding the constitutive a priori upon a "genetical" a priori ultimately leads to contradiction : phenomenology, as transcendental, proves to be either a modern empiricism,. . .
Abstract FR:
Premiere partie (t. I) : traduction francaise de la dingvorlesung de husserl (cours du semestre d'ete 1907), et de textes complementaires, publies dans l'edition originale de m. U. Claesges (hua. Vol. 16). Husserl y definit les concepts fondamentaux de sa phenomenologie de la perception : exposition et auto-position; apparition en propre et impropre; donnee optimale, direction de l'interet; orientation kinesthesique; coordination des champs sensoriels et de la motivation kinesthesique sur l'exemple visuel. Apres l'analyse fondamentale du cas de la perception inchangee, husserl degage les composantes intentionnelles de la synthese perceptive cinetique; l'inadequation essentielle de toute perception de chose est ainsi mise en evidence. Les deux dernieres sections de l'ouvrage sont consacrees a l'exploration de la coordination kinesthese-champ sensoriel, et de sa typique determinee. Seconde partie (t. Ii) : 1) commentaire succinct du traducteur, sous forme de notes renvoyant au t. I. 2) essai synthetique sur la theorie husserlienne de la constitution de la chose. L'a. Definit l'enjeu ultime de la phenomenologie de la synthese passive, comme double question du sens de l'etre et de l'etre-ainsi du monde reel. Rectifiant la mesinterpretation de l'attitude phenomenologique comme "reduction", il montre que celle-ci n'est nullement un geste cartesien; d'ou suit la determination des exigences methodiques du concept de constitution; l'analyse des presupposes de l'a priori transcendantal constitutif devoile alors l'a priori genetique et l'aporie correspondante. L'a. Situe egalement, par rapport a la constitution. . .