Abstract EN:

In this dissertation, I provide an account of Kant’s attempt to justify the moral law. To do so, I first present the full import of the problem. Contrary to what the different formulas of the moral law may suggest, the moral law is not, for Kant, a prescription but, instead, a principle that captures the very essence of any “ought”, of any Sollen, whatsoever. The problem of justifying that principle consists in showing that there is an “ought” which is not only necessary but which is “necessarily” necessary. While refusing to ground an “ought” on an “is”, i.e. on a conception of the good, Kant seeks to show that we are bound by a practical necessity that hasn’t been instituted or stipulated. Having shown this, I go on to analyze Kant’s solution of this problem, his concept of autonomy, so as to show that it must be understood on the background of a certain conception of subjectivity. This then allows me to present a novel interpretation of the two attempts to justify the moral law that Kant presents in the Groundwork and in the Critique of Practical Reason.