L'ame et le corps : dualisme, monisme, matérialisme
Institution:
Paris 10Disciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
We use concepts like soul or mind to account for the existence of mental life. They have often been defined as substantial in the mythology and the religions as well as in the philosophical theories. Various functions have been ascribed to the soul, but they always represent something which gives value to the individual. Descartes's dualist ontology makes a sharp distinction between the thinking mind and the body, pulling man absolutely apart from the natural world, and making an exception out of him because of his divine-originated mind. Descartes's metaphysics and the mecanistic science of the xviith century create the conditions for the birth of a scientific approach of the mind, which does not considers only its traditional functions, but also takes it as a belief integrated in a certain representation of reality. Today, sciences propose new conceptions, in an evolutionary style of explanation. These theories are often criticized because of their reductionism. The present work is an attempt to understand naturalism and its roots, and to defend it against conceptions in which man is considered as an exception in the natural world getting its value from this exception - which is generally what traditional humanists believe. The naturalistic point of view can no longer be disregarded. We cannot afford ourselves to have a representation of the universe which is in contradiction with the scientific knowledge and rationality. The philosopher has to make his way between these different conceptions, without simply rejecting the traditional views, which have offered psychological and social structures during ages. We propose to consider any belief in the respect of its usefulness - in an evolutionary sense - as well as in the respect of truth, and to employ naturalism for the sake of a clear-thinking humanism.
Abstract FR:
Les concepts d'ame ou d'esprit servent a rendre compte de l'existence de la vie mentale. Leur definition est a rechercher autant dans les representations mythologiques et religieuses que dans les textes philosophiques. Les fonctions assignees a l'ame sont variees, mais representent toujours ce qui donne sa valeur a l'individu. L'ontologie dualiste de descartes renforce la distinction entre l'ame pensante et le corps etendu, separant absolument l'homme du monde naturel et faisant de lui un etre d'exception, corps mecanique, mais doue d'une ame d'origine divine. La metaphysique cartesienne et la science mecaniste du xviie siecle creent les conditions de possibilite de l'apparition d'une approche scientifique de f+ ame ;, qui s'interesse aux fonctions qu'on lui reconnait, mais la considere aussi en tant qu'elle est une croyance relevant d'un certain mode de representation du monde. Les sciences contemporaines, dans la perspective du naturalisme evolutionniste, proposent des approches nouvelles de la question de l'ame et du mental. Ces approches sont souvent critiquees pour leur reductionnisme. Nous avons cherche a comprendre le cheminement qui conduit a la position naturaliste, afin d'en presenter une defense contre les conceptions qui font de l'homme une exception dans la nature - conceptions sur lesquelles s'appuient generalement les tenants de l'humanisme traditionnel. Aujourd'hui, la perspective naturaliste ne peut plus etre negligee : nos representations du monde font de plus en plus de place aux apports scientifiques, qui fournissent a la fois des connaissances et des modes de pensee. La difficulte est de les concilier avec des representations qui ont longtemps structure les croyances des individus et l'organisation des societes. Nous proposons de considerer les croyances, quelles qu'elles soient, sous l'angle de l'utilite autant que sous celui de la verite, et de mettre le naturalisme au service d'un humanisme lucide et informe.