Affectivité et intériorité recherche pour une philosophie du sujet
Institution:
Paris 10Disciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
Against the traditional still widely dominating interpretation (especially in psychology) of affectivity as having a merely vital or adaptative function and being wholly derivable in principle from physical pleasure and pain, i undertake a general redescription and new typology of the field of affectivity, which, by means of a method of phenomenological kind, and within a philosophical wittgensteinian horizon, makes appear the wide variety and heterogeneity of the different types of our affective experiences. Starting from a caracterization of the subject as a being for which something counts and makes sense, and of consciousness as exposition to and implication into what counts for the subject, one manages to describe, in opposition to the fundamental type of consciousness of object, the type of affective consciousness in general, and to give theoretical consistance, besides the notions of intensity and polarity of an affect, to those (generally controverted and suspected) of interiority and deepness, as well as to those of activity and passivity. Furtherly, one comes to the point where wide varieties of affects can be phenomenologically distinguished, among all affects of interaction, transitive feeling, existential affects and active affects. This allows a redescription of the whole field of our experience as well as a reevaluation of the diverse dimensions according to which our life gets desenvolved. Beyond numerous consequences in the fields of esthetics (e. G. Distinction of three sub-varieties of feeling), of ethics (caracterization of the sentiment of liberty, distinction morals/ethics, relationship to the animal) and of politics (new typology of the visions of politics, recaracterization of democracy), one is finally led to a general philosophy of the human subject, which gives an essential place to the components of interiority and activity.
Abstract FR:
Contre l'interpretation traditionnelle encore largement dominante aujourd'hui (notamment en psychologie) d'une affectivite a simple fonction vitale ou adaptative et tout entiere derivable en principe du plaisir et de la douleur physiques, on tente une redescription generale et une nouvelle typologie du champ de l'affectivite, qui fait apparaitre, au moyen d'une methode de type phenomenologique et a l'interieur d'un horizon philosophique wittgensteinien, la grande variete et l'heterogeneite de nos types d'experiences affectives. Partant d'une caracterisation du sujet comme etre pour qui quelque chose compte et de la conscience comme exposition et implication du sujet par rapport a ce qui compte, on peut ainsi decrire, en l'opposant au type fondamental de la conscience d'objet, le type de la conscience affective en general, et donner consistance theorique, a cote des notions d'intensite et de polarite affectives, a celles (habituellement controversees et suspectees) d'interiorite et de profondeur, et a celles d'activite et de passivite. On peut parvenir ensuite a distinguer phenomenologiquement de grandes varietes d'affects: affects d'interaction, experience du sentir, affects existentiels, affects actifs notamment, qui permettent une redescription de tout le champ de notre experience et une reevaluation des diverses dimensions selon lesquelles se deploie notre vie. Au-dela des implications nombreuses en esthetique (distinction de trois sous-varietes du sentir), en ethique (caracterisation du sentiment de liberte, distinction morale/ethique, rapport a l'animal) et en politique (nouvelle typologie des conceptions politiques, recaracterisation de la democratie), on est conduit a une philosophie generale du sujet humain qui donne une place essentielle aux composantes de l'interiorite et de l'activite.