La faute d'Épiméthée : la technique et le temps
Institution:
Paris, EHESSDisciplines:
Directors:
Abstract EN:
La premiere partie examine les theories francaises de l'evolution technique avec les concepts de systeme technique, tendance technique, et processus de concretisation. La seconde partie tente de mettre en evidence a la fois l'impossibil ite d'isoler l'anthropogenese de la technogenese et une difference de temporalite de l'evolution biologique et de l'evolution technologique de l'homme, d'ou il resulte que la technicite de l'homme est indissociable de ses capacites d'anticipation. La troisieme partie tente d'interpreter la relation entre technicite et temporalite d'une part en reinte rpretant la mythologie de promethee et d'epimethee, ou l'on met en relief une mythologie du defaut d'origine qui est aussi un recit de la constitution de la temporalite comme rapport a la mort, d'autre part en rapprochant ces analyses de l'analytique existentiale de heidegger, qui est ici a la fois reppapropriee et critiquee, dans la mesure ou elle oppose temporalite authentique et preoccupation. Le deja-la, comme passe non vecu par le dasein, est constitutif du rapport a l'avenir de cet etant. Il s'agit alors de mettre en evidence que l'acces au deja-la n'est rendu possible que par les specificites techno-logiques du weltgeschichtlich : la technicite est alors constitutive de la temporalite. La quatrieme partie est consacree d'une part a l'examen des concepts de programme et de memoire de leroi-gourhan, d'autre part aux technologies d'enregistrement analogiques, numeriques et biogiques, et enfin a une lecture de husserl, bergson et simond on. L'analyse husserlienne de l'objet temporel repose sur une opposition illegitime entre souvenir primaire, souvenir secondaire et souvenir tertiaire, fondee sur le privilege que husserl accorde alors au vecu, tandis que la temporalite se constitue depuis un deja-la non-vecu (technique et prothetique), ce que l'on nomme ici la finitude retentionnelle. L'idiotexte, concept vise par l'ensemble de ce travail, inclut le deja-la non-vecu dans l'individuation.
Abstract FR:
The first part examines the body of french theory on technical evolution together with the questions of technical system , tendency and processes of concretisation. The second part attempts to show both the impossibility of isolating anthrog enesis from technogenesis and the difference of temporality between biological evolution and the technological evolution of man, as a result of which man's technicity is shown to be indissociable from his capacities of anticipation. The third part attempts to interpret the relation between technicity and temporality: on the one hand, through a reinter pretation of the myth of prometheus and epimetheus - where a myth of a lack of origin (and of its mythology) is foregrou nded, one which is also considered as a narrative of the constitution of temporality as the relation to death-; and, on the other hand, by bringing together these latter analyses with heidegger's existential analytic in so far as the analytic wishes to oppose authentic temporality and care. The already-there, as a past which dasein does not live, is constitutive of this being's relation to the future. This part of the work then proceeds to show that access to this "already-there" is only made possible by the techno-logical specificities of the weltgeschichtliche : technicity is consequently seen to be constitutive of temporality. The fourth part is devoted, on the one hand, to an examination of the notions of programme and memory i n the work of leroi-gourhan, and, on the other hand, to the technologies of analogical, numerical and biological inscrip tion as well as, finally, to a reading of husserl, bergson and simondon. The husserlian analysis of the temporal object rests upon a series of illegitimate oppositions between primary memory, secondary memory and tertiary memory, grounded on the privilege which husserl accords to the lived, whereas temporality is constituted from a non-lived, already-there (technical and prothetic) which is called in the work retentional finitud e. The idiotext, a notion aimed at throughout the work, includes the "non-lived already-there" in individuation.